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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated
§ 78-2-2(3) (j) (Supp. 1990) and Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure to consider this appeal from the order of the
First Judicial District Court for Box Elder County, granting the
motion of Plaintiffs for summary judgment against Defendants.

Ill STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The sole issues presented by this appeal are:
(1)

Whether

the

lower

judgment against Defendants.

court

erred

in

summary

The standard of review is whether

or not there was a genuine issue of material
these

entering

fact upon which

issues could properly be submitted to a trier of fact.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 56(c); Webber v. Sill, 675 P.2d
1170 (Utah 1983).
(2)

Whether or not the Appellants appeal is frivolous or

made for purposes of delay so as to subject to the Appellant to
damages under the provisions of Rule 33 Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.

That standard of review for this determination is

whether the appeal was not grounded

in fact, not warranted by

existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend,
modify, or reverse existing law.

IV. DETERMINATIVE RULES AND STATUTES
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 4-

1

501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration (Amended 1990)
are critical to this appeal.

Rule 56(c) provides in pertinent

part:
(c)...The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith
if the
pleading,
depositions, answers
to
interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact
that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law...
(e)...When a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported [by affidavit] as provided in this rule, an
adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or
denials of his pleading, but his response, by
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must
set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond,
summary judgment,, if appropriate,shall be entered
against him.
Rule 4-501(5) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration
provides in part:
The points and authorities in opposition to a motion
for summary judgment shall begin with a section that
contains a concise statement of material facts as to
which the party contends a genuine issue exists. Each
disputed fact shall be stateid in separate numbered
sentences and shall refer with particularity to those
portions of the record upon which the opposing party
relies, and, if applicable, shall state the numbered
sentence or sentences of the movant's facts that are
disputed. All material facts set forth in the movant's
statement shall be deemed admitted for the propose of
summary judgment unless specifically controverted by
the opposing parties' statement.
The statute which is determinative of one of the primary issues
raised in this appeal is Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-13; which is
reproduced as an exhibit in Appendix A.

V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS RELEVANT TO APPEAL
The facts pertinent to this appeal are those set forth in
2

the Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support of
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.

Since Defendants did

not specifically controvert any of those facts in opposition to
Plaintiffs

motion,

this

Court

must

take

those

facts

as

established under Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
and Rule 4-501
Those

of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration.

facts, as set forth in the record below, as well as

relevant procedural facts, are as follows:
1.

Plaintiff, Shopko Stores Inc. (hereinafter referred to

as "SHOPKO"), purchased the subject property, upon which the
Defendants' sign is located, from the Co-Plaintiff, Lily Pond
Associates (hereinafter "Lily Pond"), on or about August 9, 1989.
2.

Lily Pond purchased the property from the Brigham City

Redevelopment Agency, a governmental agency, on or about June 5,
1987.
3.
by

Brigham city Redevelopment Agency acquired the property

Warranty

Deed

for

Brigham

City

Corporation, a municipal

corporation, on or about July 18, 1985.
4.

Brigham City Corporation acquired the property from the

United States of America, Department of Interior, by deeds dated
May 11, 1977; March 29, 1983; and January 22, 1985.
5.

The United States of America acquired the property for

the purpose of establishing a Veteran's Hospital in September
1942.
6.

Therefore, the property was continuous ownership by

governmental

entities

from September, 1942 to June, 1987, a
3

period of approximately 45 years.
7.

The property was in private ownership, in the name of

the Plaintiffs, for a period of only 2 6 months prior to the
filing of Plaintiffs1 Complaint.
8.

Plaintiffs have desired to develop the property for

commercial purposes and have commenced construction of a shopping
center on the property.
9.

The Defendants

are the purported owners of a sign

advertising the Bushnell Motel.

That sign is located on a

portion of the above-described property.
The sign was located on the portion of Plaintiffs1

10.

property which is adjacent to the Main Street in Brigham City, is
within an existing 20 foot utility easement, and the sign has
overhung the public sidewalk, contrary to local ordinances.
11.

A

Recorder's

search of the records at the Box Elder County

Office

establishes

that

there has never been an

instrument recorded establishing a legal interest, in favor of
Defendants, in the property upon which the sign is located.
12.

Plaintiffs1 counsel, by letter dated May 18, 1989, made

demand on Defendants that they remove the sign from the premises.
13.

Defendants, through their attorney, advised Plaintiffs

that it claimed an interest in the property and refused to move
the

sign.

Defendants

claimed

they

have

either

a

valid

"prescriptive easement", "appurtenant easement", and/or "easement
by implication".
14.

According to the information provided by Defendants,
4

the sign has been located on the property for forty years.
(Defendants1

Answer

to

Interrogatory

No.

8).

Defendants

purchased the motel,together with any interest in the sign, in
1967.
Even

though

established

by

the

facts

Defendants

recited

failure to

above

are

conclusively

controvert

them below,

Defendants attempt to introduce new alleged facts and inferences
in their

brief

on

appeal.

This

attempt

to

introduce new

allegations does not create a genuine issue of material facts;
accordingly, the Court should not even consider those alleged
facts.
facts

Nevertheless, Plaintiff disputes the following alleged
contained

in

Appellants

statement

of

the

case

with

appropriate citations to the record as to the true facts:
1.
between

Contrary to Defendants assertion, agreement for sale
Defendant

and

his

predecessor

in

interest, did not

warrant the property on which the sign was located.
of exhibit

lf M

B

Paragraph 7

attached to Defendants1 exhibit M A M in response to

Plaintiff's First Request for Production of Documents clearly
shows that the seller warranted title to the sign but merely
quit-claimed whatever interest they may have had in the property
upon which the sign was located. (See Exhibit B)

The specific

language used by sellers should have placed the Defendants on
notice they had no real interest in the property upon which the
sign was located.
2.

Contrary to Defendants assertion, Plaintiffs did not

purchase the property from Brigham City Redevelopment Agency
5

subject to any appurtenances or encroachments existing thereon,
as evidenced by the Warranty Deed dated June 8, 1987, a copy of
which is attached hereto as Exhibit C.

VI,

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

Defendants brief is an impermissible attempt to reargue the
motion lost below based upon new factual allegations unsupported
by the record and legal arguments that they failed or chose not
to raise at any time in the summary judgment proceedings below.
Since these new factual allegations and legal theories

could not

in any way have formed the basis of the lower Court's decision,
Defendant improperly attacks that decision as erroneous.

The

uncontroverted facts conclusively established that Plaintiff is
entitled to» judgment as a matter of law; therefore, the lower
Court's judgment in favor of Plaintiff must be affirmed.
Even though Defendant's brief is filled almost entirely with
new

factual

allegations

and

legal

arguments

that

were

not

sufficiently presented below, those arguments still lack merit
and in no way require reversal of the lower Court's judgment.
The fundamental flaw in Defendants" arguments is that they fail
to recognize that there are factuail prerequisites necessary to
establish a right of easement in another's property and that
those prerequisites are totally absent in this case.
Prescriptive easement can only be obtained through adverse
use and possession of another's property and adverse possession
could not legally have occurred in this case because the property
6

in question was owned by a governmental entities for a period
exceeding the life of the sign.
Further, Defendants claim of appurtenant easement also fails
because of Defendants failure to establish the factual basis upon
which this claim could be granted, as a matter of law.
The lower Court correctly granted Plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment since there were no genuine issues of material
fact.

Appellants failed to controvert any of the material facts

set forth in the memorandum and affidavit Plaintiff submitted to
the Court below.

Since, as a matter of undisputed fact, there

was absolutely no notice of any easement or any other interest in
the subject property available through the usual means at the Box
Elder

County

property

right

Recorder's
must

be

Office,
based

Defendants'

upon

the

claim

existence

of
of

some
facts

sufficient to give rise to those claims; and the lower Court's
judgment should be affirmed.

VII.

ARGUMENT

A. TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT DEFENDANTS HAD NOT
ESTABLISHED ANY FACTUAL OR LEGAL BASIS FOR THEIR CLAIM
OR APPURTENANT EASEMENT.
To establish the existence of an "appurtenant easement" there
must be both a dominant and a servient estate.

The trial Court

that Defendants' claim of appurtenant easement was not supported
by the facts presented.

The Defendant claims that property upon

which it's motel is located must be the dominant estate and the
Plaintiff's property, situated a block distant and upon which
7

Defendants1 sign advertising the motel is located, must be the
servient estate.

There is no evidence and no claim that these

two parcels were ever part of the same property or under common
ownership.

The time an appurtenant easement is created, the

grantor must have some interest in the property being affected by
the easement, otherwise the permission for that use would be a
trespass and without authorization.

An appurtenant easement was

not granted in this case as there is no record of its being
granted

and there is no factual allegation of its being granted

by any person in the past.

Defendants state that the contract,

by which Defendants purchased the motel property, established
some interest in the property now owned by Plaintiffs.

This

allegation is not supported by fact as evidenced by the Uniform
Real Estate Contract dated February 1, 1967 and produced by the
Defendants as Exhibit "A" to its response to Plaintiffs1 Request
for Production of Documents, a copy of which is attached hereto
as Exhibit B.

The sellers merely granted to Defendants whatever

interest, if any, "which they may have to the property upon which
the signs are located."

Another

requirement

for

establishing

appurtenant easement is that the two estates be located adjacent
to each other.

Vanderbilt Law Rcaview (1986 page 111) .

This

element was not established by Defendants since the parcels are,
in fact, separated by one block distance.

Further, appurtenant

easements have been traditionally imposed for ingress, egress,
conveyance of water or similar uses, without which the benefitted
parcel is essentially without value.
8

The thing being benefitted

in this case is not the property itself, but the business of
operating a motel upon the property.
basis for an appurtenant easement.
662 (Idaho).

This is not a sufficient

Nelson v. Johnson, 679 P. 2d

The mere existence of a billboard sign on another's

property does not give right to an appurtenant easement,

Zinser,

et al v. Luks, 235 S.W.2d 844. Defendant has merely had the free
use of someone elses property for forty years.

Defendants1 claim

of appurtenant easement failed, not because a single factual
element

was

missing,

but

because

no

factual

elements

were

established which could support Defendants' theory.
B. THE TRAIL COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT DEFENDANTS HAD
NOT ESTABLISHED ANY FACTUAL OR LEGAL BASIS FOR THEIR
CLAIMS OF PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT OR ADVERSE POSSESSION.
Defendants

appear

to

claim

that by merely

alleging

an

easement by prescription, a question of fact arises that must be
determined by a jury.
wit:

are

there

Defendants beg the critical question, to-

questions

of

fact

which,

if

proven,

are

sufficient to establish elements for a prescriptive easement?
Defendants

fail

to

accept

both

established

common

law

and

statutory mandate that one cannot obtain an interest in the land
of another by adverse use or possession when the other property
owner

is

a

governmental

entity

for

governmental

purposes.

Averett v. Utah County Drainage District No. 1, 763 P.2d 428 and
Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-13.

The property owned by Plaintiff

had been under governmental ownership for over 45 years at the
time this action was filed.

Defendants have claimed that the
9

sign in question had been in that location for forty years, the
commencement of which period was five years into the governmental
ownership period.

The property in question has only been in

private ownership since June, 1987,

less than two years prior to

Plaintiffs1 written notice demanding Defendants remove the sign.
It

is

clear

that

the

period

for

obtaining

an

easement by

prescription on public land does begin to run until the land has
been transferred from public to private ownership.
Iliff, 775 P.2d

754

(New Mex

1989).

Herbertson v.

That short period is

insufficient, as a matter of law, to establish a prescriptive or
adverse right to possession or use.

Crane v. Crane, 683 P.2d

1062 (Utah 1984); Jensen v. Brown, 639 P.2d 150 (Utah 1982).

The

person

the

claiming

a

prescriptive

easement

must

establish

necessary elements by clear and convincing evidence.

Marchant v.

Park City, 771 P.2d 677 (Utah App. 1989); Garmond v. Kinney, 579
P.2d

178

(New Mex

1978).

Defendants would

only have been

entitled to a jury trial if there had been genuine issues of
material fact.

However, the factual issues were not in dispute,

although the legal conclusions which could be drawn from the
undisputed facts, were.

Simply put, the Defendants provided no

factual basis for a claim of prescriptive easement upon which the
Court could rule in its favor, since a prescriptive easement
requires adverse possession and adverse possession could not have
occurred against this property which was owned by governmental
entities since 1942.
C. THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
SHOULD
BE AFFIRMED BECAUSE THERE IS NO GENUINE
10

ISSUE AS TO ANY
MATERIAL FACT AND PLAINTIFF WAS
ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A
MATTER OF LAW.
Defendants continue to assert that because some factual
issues may have been in dispute, the Defendant is necessarily
entitled to a trial in this case.

The criteria is whether or not

there are issues of material fact.

Webber v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170

(Utah

1983).

Frankly, Defendants have failed

to raise any

"genuine issues of material fact".
The United States Supreme Court in

Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 106 S.Ct. 2505 (1986), ruled as follows:
"...the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute
between the parties will not defeat an otherwise
properly supported motion for summary judgment; the
requirement is that there be no genuine issue of
material fact."
Further, that Court also ruled that
"...there is no issue for trial unless there is
sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving party for a
jury to return a verdict for that party... if the
evidence is merely tolerable...or is not significantly
probative...summary judgment may be granted."
Also, additional language, which is helpful in our case, stated
that:
the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in
support of (the non-moving party's) position will be
insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury
could reasonably find for (that party)."
There are no facts provided by Defendants upon which any of
the

alleged

undisputed

legal
facts

theories can be sustained.
establish

only

that

Clearly, the

Defendants

and

their

predecessors have enjoyed the unauthorized benefit of another's
property

without

payment, without
11

a

recorded

interest, and

without any attempt by them to perfect any of their alleged
easement claims.
The purpose of summary judgment is well established; to-wit:
to avoid the time, expense, and burden of a frivolous trial by
reviewing a case as presented by the parties to determine if a
genuine issue of fact exists.

Webber, at 1172, the United States

Supreme Court discussed the question of summary judgment criteria
in great
(1986).

length

in Celotex Corp. v. Katrett, 106 S.Ct 2548

The Court there ruled as follows:

In our view, the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates
the entry of summary judgment after adequate time for
discovery and upon motion, against the party who fails
to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence
of an essential element to that party's case, and on
which that party will bear the burden of proof at
trial. In such a situation, there can be "no genuine
issue as to any material fact,"
since a complete
failure of proof concerning an essential element of the
non-moving party's case necessarily renders all facts
immaterial. The moving party is "entitled to judgment
as a matter of law" because the non-moving party has
failed to make a sufficient showing of an essential
element of (its) case with respect to which (it) has
the burden of proof. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 321.
Further, the Celotex Court went on to explain that:
Summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as
a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an
integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which
are designed "to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action."
The trial judge below obviously applied these standards in
his determination of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and
no authority is given which would lead to a contrary result.
D. DEFENDANTS APPEAL HEREIN IS FRIVOLOUS AND THE COURT
SHOULD AWARD TO THE PLAINTIFFS JUST DAMAGES.
Rule 33, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that the
12

Court may assess damages upon a finding that the appeal taken is
either frivolous or for delay.

A frivolous appeal is defined in

Rule 33(b) as follows:
"...one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by
existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to
extend, modify, or reverse existing law. An appeal...
interposed for the purpose of delay is one interposed
for any improper purpose such as to harass, cause
needless increase in the cost of litigation, or gain
time that will benefit only the party filing the
appeal..."
Defendants have been aware from the time counsel received written
notice to remove the sign from the property in May, 1989, that
the property was subject to a pending sale for use as a shopping
center and that the existence of the sign on the property impeded
that sale.

Prior to filing this lawsuit, Plaintiff offered to

pay for the relocation costs of the sign in addition to payment
of other sums, as nuisance value to avoid the requirement of
extended and expensive litigation.

Plaintiff's counsel further

provided Defendants with the same basic authority as was used in
the motion for summary judgment to establish that Plaintiffs1
claims

were

ignored,

virtually

without

merit.

Those

requests

were

forcing the Plaintiffs to file quiet title action,

resulting in considerable monetary loss to the Plaintiffs , in
addition to legal fees and costs incurred in connection with this
case, to date.
Plaintiffs

assert

that, under

costs and reasonable attorney

the

circumstances, treble

fees should be awarded to the

Plaintiffs, in addition to affirming the Court's Order for
Summary Judgment.
13

VIII.

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing reasons and the file herein,
including Plaintiff's Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the
decision of the trial Court in granting summary judgment should
be sustained and Defendant's appeal denied.

The trial Court's

decision was well reasoned and based upon the issues raised and
factual

matters

asserted

by

the

parties.

The

lower

Court

correctly concluded that the Plaintiffs were entitled to quiet
title in the subject property and that Defendants had no legal
claim of easement thereto.

The facts supporting the lower Courts

conclusion are uncontroverted, and the law, which Defendants did
not attack below, is clear.

The Court should summarily dismiss

the arguments and purported factual issues that Defendants seek
to raise on appeal.

Further, those arguments and purported

issues lack merit and do not change the fact that Plaintiffs were
and are entitled to quiet title and the Court should affirm in
all respects the lower Courts judgment.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of November, 1990.

MERRILL G. HANSEN
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee
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been held adversely
1953
tenancy, or, where there has been no written lease,
until the expiration of seven years from the time of
78-12-11. What constitutes adverse possession
the last payment of rent, notwithstanding that such
not under written instrument.
tenant may have acquired another title, or may have
For the purpose of constituting an adverse possesclaimed to hold adversely to his landlord, but such
sion by a person claiming title, not founded upon a
presumption cannot be made after the periods herein
written instrument, judgment or decree, land is
deemed to have been possessed and occupied in the
following cases only
(1) where it has been protected by a substantial inclosure
(2) where it has been usually cultivated or improved
(3) where labor or money has been expended
upon dams, canals, embankments, aqueducts or
otherwise for the purpose of irrigating such lands
amounting to the sum of $5 per acre
1953
78-12-12.

P o s s e s s i o n m u s t be c o n t i n u o u s , a n d
taxes paid
In no case shall adverse possession be considered
established under the provisions of any section of this
code, unless it shall be shown that the land has been
occupied and claimed for the period of seven years
continuously, and that the partv, his predecessors
and grantors have paid all taxes which have been
levied and assessed upon such land according to law
1953

78-12-12.1.

P o s s e s s i o n a n d p a y m e n t of t a x e s —
P r o v i s o — T a x title

limited

1953

78-12-15.

P o s s e s s i o n not affected b y d e s c e n t
cast
The right of a person to the possession of real prop
erty is not impaired or affected by a descent cast in
consequence of the death of a person in possession of
such property
1953
78-12-16.

A c t i o n to r e d e e m m o r t g a g e of real
property.
No action to redeem a mortgage (of] real property,
with or without an account of rents and profits, ma\
be brought by the mortgager, or those claiming under
him, against the mortgagee in possession, or those
claiming under him unless he or they have continu
ously maintained |anl adverse possession of the mort
gaged premises for seven years after breach of some
condition of the mortgage
1953
78-12-17.

R e d e m p t i o n w h e n m o r e t h a n one
mortgagor.
If there is more than one such mortgagor, or more
than one person claiming under a mortgagor some of

EXHIBIT B.

Supplemental provisions of Uniform Real Estate Contract
of February 1, 1967 between DAVID E. SORENSEN and VERLA A.
SORENSEN, his wife, sellers, and LYMAN W. HEMMERT, buyer,
covering sale of Brigham Motel, Brigham City, Utah:
1. Interest on the unpaid contract balance shall be
charged at the rate of four and one-half (4%%) percent per
annum until such time as the existing mortgage with Utah
Mortgage Loan is paid in full; at such time as said mortgage
is paid in full, interest on the unpaid contract balance shall
be increased to six (670) percent per annum.
2. Sellers shall execute no loans secured by the
property as provided under paragraph 8 of the Uniform Real
Estate Contract wherein the number of installments exceed the
number of installments due sellers under this contract.
3. Buyer agrees to maintain the property in such a
manner as to comply with all FHA regulations and requirements
as disclosed by annual FHA inspections. Sellers represent
that all existing FHA requirements have been met, with the
exception of exterior painting of the interior court which
must be done as soon as weather permits; said painting to be
done by buyer.
4. In the event buyer defaults in this agreement,
buyer agrees and by this agreement does hereby transfer and
assign to sellers as additional security for said agreement,
all future rents and rentals from the property to the extent
necessary to bring the contract current, and consents that
sellers may enter upon the premises and collect said rents
and rentals and apply the same against any outstanding balances which may be due and owing. The exercise of this remedy
shall not affect sellers1 right to an election of remedies as
provided in the Uniform Real Estate Contract herein.
5. Buyer agrees to maintain the inventory of personal
property in the same or greater quantities as said inventory
exists as of the contract date.
6. All rents, taxes, insurance and reserves shall be
pro-rated between the parties as of February 1, 1967, and an
appropriate credit or debit, as the case may be, shall be made
against the contract balance.
V

7. All existing signs are included in this sale, and
sellers warrant title to said signs, including the sign located on the corner one-half block west of the property and /

LAW OFFICES
Thomas,

Armstrong,

HuwlUigb & We&t

1300 WALKER BANK BUILDING
•ALT LAKf CITY

u

the sign located at Perry, Utah. Sellers quit-claim to buyer
all right, title and interest which they may have to the property
upon which the signs are located. Sellers represent that the
Perry sign is located upon leased premises presently at the rate
of $25.00 per month; sign rental to be pro-rated between the
parties as of the date of this contract.

id
//

Sellers

Buyer

LAW u r n c c s
Thomas. Armstrong, R*vllngi & Went
ISOO

WALKER
•ALT

BANK

LAKK

BUILDING

CITY

<

^

-

HILLAM AGENCY

Mail Tax Notice: LILLY POND ASSOCIATES, 60 East 42nd Street, New York, New York 10022
c/o William Lubliner

WARRANTY DEED
grantor

BRIGHAM CITY REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY
of
Brighan City
CONVEY andWARRANT

County of

State of Utah, hereby

Box Elder

to

LILLY POND ASSOCIATES, a Delaware general partnership
grantee
of
for the sum of

County

, State of Utah

ONE MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND AND NO/100 - - ($ 1,500,000.00POLLARS

the following described tract of land in

g ^ Ei<j er

County,

State of Utah, to-wit:
(See attached Exhibit A, Property Description)
Subject to the terns and conditions of the AGREEMENT FDR DISPOSITION OF LAND.
Dated June
&**
1987, which is recorded concurrently herewith.

A. D. 1987

WITNESS the hand of aaid grantor , this
Signed in the presence of

Brigham City Redevelopment Agency

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF

ss.

BOX ELDER
On the %

day of

June

A. D. 19 8 7

personally

appeared before me PETER C. KNUDSON, Chairman of the Brigham
City Redevelopment Agency
the signer of the within instrument who doly acknowledged
to me that he executed the same. t and was SJO authorized.

My Commission Expires:

\bAQO

-Residing at

Je^iL^L
M

^

••

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the BRIEF OF APPELLEE, to Dale M. Dorius, 29 South Main Street,
P.O. Box U, Brigham City, Utah
84032, postage pre-paid, this
19th day of November, 1990.

Paralegal

o^vru^- (

